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The personal status of migrants: still a matter of private 
international law? – the dark side of the picture 
 
I. The personal status of migrants: still a matter of private international law? Yes 
and no 
This topic is being presented in the form of a question: The personal status of migrants: 
still a matter of private international law (“PIL”)?  This is certainly a rather provocative 
question for a PIL lawyer. My own answer to this question would be both negative and 
positive, a combined yes and no. I will also give some comments on the speech of Prof. 
Meeusen while explaining the reasons for my yes and no. 
 
II. The personal status of migrants: less and less a matter of private international 
law !? 
I believe that the personal status of migrants is tending to become less and less a matter 
of PIL, as there are at least three other disciplines trying to take over parts of PIL, trying 
to overrule and influence it, or at the very least functioning in interaction with it. Each is 
interwoven with principles of human rights. 
 
II.A. The interaction with the discipline of substantive family law 
The first discipline to be focused on is the discipline of substantive family law. The 
starting-point taken here is that PIL establishes a kind of what I would call hidden legal 
cultural pluralism in a legal system. Different categories of people rely on different rules 
of family law, but the pluralism is limited. One condition is that PIL only plays a role if 
an “international element” is present. Some people now believe that legal pluralism 
should go further, in fact they would like to allow more diversity and flexibility in the 
substantive law itself. They argue, for example, that a situation could be seen as 
completely “internal” from a PIL perspective, once the people involved are established 
and naturalized, but that even then, there may still be a ‘cultural’ belonging to another 
legal system. An example of a question arising in this context is whether PIL is still a 
convenient way for dealing with cultural differences, in times where there is a lot of 
mobility and where people settle down. The connection with principles of human rights 
becomes obvious when one remembers the relevance of respect for cultural identity and 
all related issues and debates, as Prof. Meeusen also already showed through the example 
of repudiation.  
 
PIL could also function in another way, as a catalyst for modifications in substantive 
family law. Let me use, as an example, the institution of same-sex marriage, which can 
serve as an interesting case-study. If, for example, a European member state has not yet 
introduced same-sex marriages into its legal system, it is imaginable that this country 
would however recognize a same-sex marriage created elsewhere, perhaps even if it 
would concern two national citizens living abroad. It could happen that the European 
court of justice would, sooner or later, force this country to recognize this marriage – e.g. 
in analogy with the Grunkin-Paul-case!? Now, citizens whose relationships are situated in 
a purely internal context might see this as a kind of reverse discrimination if they are not 
given access to the same institutions: people who never migrated are in fact being denied 
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access to this institution. People could argue that what is possible under rules of 
recognition should also be made possible in the country itself, ultimately even in 
substantive law. This kind of argumentation, possibly resulting in a kind of “backwards 
progression”, isn’t necessarily a successful one, but it is a possibility. Awareness of this 
possible mechanism could either stimulate or refrain people from pleading for liberal 
rules of recognition. Examples of the principles to be taken into account here are 
principles of non-discrimination, (combat of) fraud, and respect for the cultural values of 
a society.  
 
II.B. The influence of and interaction with European law 
I have already touched on the second relevant discipline which is interwoven with PIL by 
referring to the possibility that the European Court of Justice could force European 
countries to recognise same-sex marriages under certain circumstances, and that is the 
discipline of European law. Indeed, it is clear that European institutions tend to intervene 
more and more in PIL. 
 
The dynamics of this discipline are basically centered around the central principle of 
freedom of movement of EU-citizens and their family members. The tendency is, as Prof. 
Meeusen explained, to liberalize international family law - in the sense of stimulating 
party-autonomy, creating more possilibities within law concerning names, more 
possibilities to marry or to divorce …-, in order to stimulate the freedom of movement.  
 
Thus, the principle of freedom of movement of EU-citizens pushes international family 
law into a process of liberalization: the awareness that mobility of European citizens 
within the Union can be influenced by the way people weigh the pros and cons of the 
impact of mobility on the regulation of their family life, spurs on the elaboration of a 
liberal European international family law. Apparently European authorities are convinced 
that a liberal system of PIL could stimulate freedom of movement, and from there we can 
see interventions in PIL both by the court of justice as well as by the European legislator.     
 
Rather sensational examples of the issues at stake here are often highlighted in the media, 
for example the already-mentioned issue of same-sex-marriages, and in particular the 
problems non-recognition of these marriages might cause for EU-citizens who make use 
of their right of freedom of movement in a European country. 
 
A question to be asked is how far exactly could European law push member states 
towards liberalization of their PIL. “How liberal should we be?” seems to be one of the 
main questions PIL is nowadays confronted with within the European context. This gives 
rise, of course, to large-scale discussions on the right to protect national cultural or moral 
values. Focus on the protection of these values could certainly slow down tendencies in 
the liberalizing of international family law. But the tendency to liberalization is strong, 
and as Prof. Meeusen explained human rights could certainly also lend support to the 
tendency towards liberalization of PIL. The aim of stimulating the freedom of movement 
and the aim of promoting human rights, such as protection of family life, finally appear to 
go rather well together, and liberal rules of PIL fit well together in this movement.  
 
 3 
Prof. Meeusen warns however that member states should not be obliged to adapt their 
rules of PIL completely for the sake of stimulating the freedom of movement. Basically, I 
agree, even though personally I think I have more sympathy than Prof. Meeusen has for 
the tendency to liberalization of international family law. Say, for example, that even if 
no human rights as such would be effected, I would be in favor of liberalizing the rules of 
PIL in several cases, for example on the basis of principles such as favoring marriage and 
favoring divorce.  
 
II.C. The influence of and interaction with migration law – the dark side of the 
dynamics of influences of socio-economic concerns on PIL  
By talking about freedom of movement, a link has already been made to the third 
discipline that I want to discuss: migration law. Freedom of movement could possibly be 
seen as one aspect of migration law. Another aspect is, of course, migration coming 
“from outside” and mobility of third party nationals. We talk here about the discipline of 
migration law as a whole, and I would even understand migration law in this context to 
also include aspects of nationality law and social security law.  
 
I think it is necessary to pay attention to the dynamics going on in the interaction between 
PIL and migration law, in addition to the contribution of Prof. Meeusen, because when 
focusing on these dynamics, we find in fact another side to the picture. I would call it the 
dark side of the picture; the influences of socio-economic concerns on PIL. Whereas in 
the European context, it is clear that PIL is developing in a liberalizing way, and the 
question is just how far exactly this tendency will go, in the context of the relation to 
immigration law I would say the dynamics are working in the opposite direction. I notice 
here that there is a tendency to manipulate PIL in a restrictive way. The question seems 
rather to be one of how far exactly this tendency of restriction could go. In the context of 
confrontation with migration coming from outside the Union, the main question seems to 
be “how restrictive can we be?”, in particular how restrictive can we be in legislating on 
residence claims, social security claims, and nationality claims for non-occidental 
foreigners. In fact, it often seems as if the rules of PIL are sometimes simply left aside 
and that margins within PIL are used just to ensure a negative result for those who claim 
rights of residence, social security or nationality based on family relationships.  
 
The dynamics of restriction is obvious. What is more: legal interventions are flanked by 
the divulgence of ideologies justifying these changes, ideologies calling to go even 
further in restricting claims being made by foreigners. It has become mainstream to 
pretend that in the past foreigners were given too many rights, that authorities were too 
soft in dealing with abuses and fraud and that now the time has come to change rules and 
apply rules in a tougher way, for the sake of foreigners themselves; it has become 
mainstream to pretend that having a double sense of belonging is not really possible, and 
certainly not something desirable; it has become mainstream to argue that so-called 
cultural or religious problems, such as unequality between men and women, are to be 
seen as the main causes of integration problems, … Such a presentation and 
problematization certainly influences the way one will be inclined to act, intervene, and 
legislate. This kind of mainstream thinking is very prevalent in the Netherlands. I think 
actually that these ideas need to be demystified.   
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Recently I contributed to a project coordinated by the Dutch Family Council 
(“Nederlandse Gezinsraad”). In this project we also dealt with the question of how 
migration law and ideologies going together with a restrictive migration policy influence 
other areas of law. One of the questions addressed was whether the way different areas of 
law interplay - such as the interplay between family law, migration law and social 
security law - leads to a weakening of the situation of foreigners. And indeed, this 
appears to happen, rules in some areas of law appear to function as a spoilsport for claims 
in other areas of law. In this study, the discipline of PIL was included as a case-study of 
the dynamics on how migration law and migration policy influences other areas of law 
and weaken the position of foreigners. In fact, it was quickly apparent by that the way 
PIL-rules are promulgated and applied, the position of foreigners could be weakened in 
an indirect way. Because by regulating mobility, residence, social security and nationality 
issues of foreigners, one is inevitably confronted with the intricacies of PIL. For example, 
the recognition of a foreign marriage or of a foreign judgment containing a change of age 
of a foreigner – both typical issues of PIL – could be decisive in evaluating a residence 
claim or a retirement claim; thus PIL, in reality, often functions as a building block and a 
hinge between family law and other areas of law: so, for example, it is not the field of 
PIL that determines whether one can ascribe residence claims based on certain family 
relationships or not; but when a decision in migration law has been taken that under 
certain circumstances a marriage could lead to a residence claim PIL rules could become 
crucial, as they can decide whether, for example, a marriage created abroad should be 
recognized or not. Now it appears that rules of PIL could be manipulated in the sense that 
they are promulgated or applied in a way ensuring a negative effect for foreigners. If such 
manipulation takes place, in one way or another, one could speak of a kind of 
instrumentalization of PIL for restrictive migration policy. In 1997 I finished my PhD in 
Belgium in a rather dramatic way by warning for the consequences of negative 
instrumentalization of PIL for objectives of restrictive migration law. I really feared this, 
but perhaps it was also attractive to write about, as it can sound very interesting and 
dramatic to do so. Nowadays, 8 years later, I believe the phenomenon of 
instrumentalization of PIL for restrictive migration policy should still not be 
overestimated, and thus perhaps talking about this may still seem more dramatic that it is. 
However, after having migrated from Belgium to the Netherlands and having studied 
Dutch PIL over the past number of years, I have found more and more incidents and 
illustrations of this phenomenon. Where PIL-issues involve non-European foreigners, 
Dutch authorities sometimes tend to use PIL-rules in such a way as to prevent non-
European migrants from claiming residence, social security and nationality, and so 
selectively restrict the mobility of non-European foreigners. Examples could be found, 
for example, in the context of legalization and verification of documents, as explained by 
Prof. Boeles in his book on the subject of legalization and verification of foreign 
documents, or in some practices in social security law, dealing with claims for child 
allowances based on filiation, or widow pensions based on a marriage, or in the way 
concerns of restrictive migration law are actually introduced in conflict rules themselves, 
for example, concerning marriages and filiation. I have described and criticized these 
incidents in several publications in a rather technical way. 
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As I said, the phenomenon should not be overestimated; there are of course 
counterexamples to be given, and sometimes practices even change in a positive way. But 
the main tendency appears to be a tendency to restricting the claims of foreigners, with an 
echo in PIL. In PIL-debates, one could also find echos of the ideologies going on today. 
There is, for example, as I mentioned, this overwhelming presentation of fraud, a clear 
call to combat fraud, and the question how PIL should deal with allegations of fraud; 
there are the ideas about dominance of non-occidental men and subordination of women. 
Here one often thinks of issues such as repudiation and polygamy. But I think that it is 
interesting to mention here, as a kind of striking example of what happens in reality, that 
in the Netherlands, for example, for several years a number of Moroccan men were, 
through rules of PIL, completely hindered in their efforts to divorce their wives who 
wouldn’t agree to divorce; a repudiation was not recognised because the women didn’t 
accept the repudiation, but at the same time a “Dutch” divorce wasn’t offered to them; 
one case had to go to the highest Dutch court before the man could divorce. This example 
seems striking to me, mainly in a Dutch context, because in the Netherlands both men 
and women can, in fact, divorce without the consentement of the partner, but these 
Moroccan men were in fact blocked from doing so. 
 
In fact, more generally speaking, I think that foreigners, both women and men, are 
nowadays more and more hindered and destabilized in several ways in the organization 
of their family life. They have less and less choices on how to organize their family life, 
and I fear that rules of PIL contribute far too often to the further complication of their 
lives.  
 
While the lives of these foreigners becomes more and more complicated, I recall at the 
same time that the ambition of European authorities, as they expressed it themselves, is to 
“make easier” the life of European citizens, through PIL. Making European citizens’ lives 
easier seems to require a unification of PIL in a liberalizing way. Personally, I have 
sympathy for the process, judged on its own merits, for the liberalization of international 
family law that takes place under European impulses. I realize that the process of 
liberalization can’t be, and shouldn’t be, without any limit, but in its essence I think it is a 
good evolution as evaluated from its substance, as I am in favor of liberalization 
tendencies and as I think basic PIL-concerns about, for example, international harmony, 
no-loss-of-rights, legal security, non-discrimination, do ultimately and basically fit well 
together in a tendency to stimulate the mobility of people. At the same time, seeing what 
is going on in European PIL, I also have some hope that the dynamics going on within 
the European context could have a wider positive effect. In fact, European interferences 
with PIL could possibly also influence PIL in general, for example, through arguments 
based on the indirect effect of European law, or arguments based on the need for 
consistency in PIL. If this effect does not take place, or if only a limited category of 
people could pull themselves up to the European dynamics, ultimately we could be 
confronted with the emergence of a kind of double-track policy in the process of dealing 
with PIL: liberalizing tendencies in PIL as opposed to restrictive tendencies, in parallel 
with current two-track policies in migration law itself, in fact as an echo and 
amplification of migration law itself. Ultimately, one could imagine that the EU’s 
interference with PIL itself would be a double-track one, depending on the nature of the 
case – purely intracommunitarian or including external aspects, to the extent that the EU 
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would interfere with PIL in cases having “external aspects”. In fact, since the EU has 
enlarged its competency over immigration law and PIL and aims to unify rules on issues 
such as “family reunification” of non-European immigrants, interference of the EU in 
PIL issues that are not purely “intracommunitarian” becomes conceivable. This raises the 
possibility that actual tendencies in national ways of dealing with PIL, going along with 
restrictive migration policy, may be the precursors of future European practices. It is also 
conceivable that the elaboration of a “liberal” system of European PIL will undergo a 
“backlash” under the influence of concerns that are currently perceptible on a national 
level. Seen this way, PIL finds itself caught in fields of forces of competence, substance 
and political influences acting on the discipline 
 
Of course, one could pretend that it is quite logical that politics, including migration 
policies, which have been generally accepted, have an effect on several areas of law, 
including a discipline such as PIL. Each discipline should just do its own bit, one could 
say. Moreover, it is not quite new or unique that tendencies of instrumentalization are felt 
in PIL for political goals. It is, for example, striking that actually right now, in the 
Netherlands, legislation is being prepared to make PIL even useful in combating 
terrorism, namely through adaptation of PIL-rules on international company law and non-
governmental organizations. There are also older examples. I recall here, for instance, the 
discussions in Dutch PIL on how PIL could contribute to combat environmental 
pollution. In the 90’s, a book on this issue of environmental pollution and PIL was 
published under the title “pollution in PIL”. So, the issue of instrumentalization of PIL 
isn’t quite unique or new, but still, I think that it is a specific one as far as it concerns the 
intrumentalization of PIL for restrictive migration policy. As far as one would present 
this instrumentalization as a kind of interest analysis of governments, this should be seen 
as a particular way of weighing interests of states: states influence the way international 
family law is ruled out and applied from the interest they have in the effect the existence 
of the international family relationship will have on a public claim, based on this family 
relationship.  
 
I think that if restrictive migration law effects PIL, we can speak of a real “pollution” of 
PIL, which should be regarded in a negative way. Not only because I think the restrictive 
migration policy itself and ideologies going along with this policy are to be criticized, 
and PIL should at least not collaborate with this policy, but also because I think aims of 
restrictive migration policy, in any case, basically don’t fit at all with principles of PIL; 
moreover, manipulating PIL for objectives of restrictive migration policy constitutes a 
rather tricky way of frustrating claims and sometimes even frustrating respect for human 
rights such as the protection of family life. If one says that when a person is married he or 
she should enjoy protection of family life, then this right could be frustrated through the 
subtle application of PIL rules dealing with the definition of marriage in an international 
context. 
 
Concluding this issue: we can see nowadays, in the Netherlands, both direct and indirect 
attacks on foreigners’ claims. Some are justified on a so-called humanitarian basis, some 
are presented just as rude as they are. Sometimes I think one should focus on the direct 
attacks, rather than the rather hidden ones. But ultimately, I think it is important to 
criticize measures, if they are not right, whether they are presented on a humanitarian 
 7 
basis or on a xenophobical basis, and whether measures and practices frustrate claims 
directly or indirectly - for example, through practices in which PIL is used in a tricky way 
to frustrate claims. The indirect ones are often a reflection of the direct ones. What is 
more: as the indirect ones often transform claims which foreigners should still be able to 
invoke into pure optical illusions, they even often deprive foreigners from the claims 
which in the end still seemed to be left for them. 
 
III. The personal status of migrants: more and more a matter of private 
international law !? 
As there are obviously forces in different disciplines trying to influence PIL in one way 
or another, the foregoing could lead to the conclusion that PIL itself tends to become less 
important. But at the same time, in a rather paradoxical way, there are reasons to believe 
that PIL has nowadays the potential to become more important than ever.  
 
Indeed, the very fact that other disciplines try to put their mark on PIL just shows that it 
is aknowledged how important this discipline is and how important it is how PIL “stands” 
in these fields of forces. Moreover, situations in which PIL issues come forward could 
appear to multiply, or PIL rules could come forward in a very prominent way, just by the 
way people actually make use of their freedom of movement, or by the way people try to 
avoid obstacles created by restrictive migration policy.   
 
For example, one could be reminded here of the EJC-case of Hacene Akrich, a case 
involving the UK and Ireland, but also of great importance for the Netherlands. In fact, 
because of the restrictions in Dutch migration law many Dutch people, who wish to live 
together with a “third country national”, move to another European country in order to 
become EU-citizens who make use of their right of freedom of movement and thus fall 
under the more liberal European law. Afterwards, they often move back to the 
Netherlands, having won the right to living together with their partner. Dutch people thus 
sometimes become mobile, leave their country and use, for example, the so-called 
“Belgian road” in order to have the right to family reunion. In the case of Hacene Akrich, 
the court of justice dealt with certain aspects of this strategy. PIL rules were not as such 
dealt with in the case. But of course, the case shows the relevance of how Belgium and 
the Netherlands apply their rules concerning the creation of a marriage or the recognition 
of each other’s marriages or marriages created in a third country, how their PIL rules deal 
with sham marriages and so on. In the Hacene Akrich case, the court dealt with the issue 
of “fraud”, and with the principle of respect for family life. The case also raises questions 
in PIL law on how to deal with fraud.  
 
It seems clear that in the European context, as Prof. Meeusen explained at a recent 
conference in Antwerpen, it is not allowed to speak too quickly about “fraud” and it isn’t 
allowed for member states to take measures, too easily, to combat so-called fraud. In this 
context, one speaks rather of “shopping” than of “fraud”. The question is whether things 
are seen differently in “a non-European context”. Here, one is overwhelmed these days 
by allegations of “fraud” by foreigners, even if the reality is that foreigners are often 
simply pushed into a situation of complete deadlock and are just trying to find a way out. 
One of my fears is that under the motto of combating fraud, foreigners will be even more 
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blocked, and that PIL techniques such as the exception of public policy will be used for 
this goal of reducing foreigners’ claims.  
  
IV. In conclusion  
Speaking in a more general way, I believe that principles of PIL are largely in accordance 
with basic principles of European law. It remains important, as Prof. Meeusen said, that 
PIL’s own way of thinking is taken seriously in this context, but in essence, basic 
principles of PIL such as the principle of stimulating legal security, and the principle of 
stimulating international harmony, the aim of no-loss of rights, as combined with human 
rights go together rather well with European concerns about stimulating freedom of 
movement. On the other hand, I believe basic principles of PIL are not compatible with 
the goals of a restrictive migration policy. I believe that mainly in this field of force, it is 
important to take PIL seriously in order to avoid that PIL renders itself into an instrument 
of restrictive migration policy, with all the ideologies that are attached to it. I believe that 
if PIL-lawyers want to avoid PIL being swallowed up by other disciplines and political 
aims within these disciplines, they should certainly also be vigilant for the way restrictive 
migration policy and ideologies going along with this policy try to swallow up, or at least 
influence PIL, and they should check if human rights are truly respected in this context. 
 
Veerle Van Den Eeckhout 
